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Under Order 53 of the Rules ofthe Supreme Court, as confirmed by section 31 of
the Supreme Court Act 1981, the procedure by which the remedy of judicial
review is made available is by way of application for judicial review. The function
of this remedy, and of the former prerogative writs, is the control of the manner in
which power is exercised - usually in the hands of the executive and executive
agencies under statute, and more rarely in the hands of the Crown in the form of
the Royal prerogative. The one feature distinguishing power which is subject to
this kind of control from other forms of power is its public character. The courts
are re-defining, in broader terms, the kind of power that is to be regarded as of a
public character. The result is that the exercise of power once thought to be
immune from challenge may now fall within the supervisory jurisdiction. At the
root of this view is the idea that the aggregation of power, the exercise of which
affects the public without recourse, is in some way contrary to public policy and
should be subject to restraint. Of course, this idea and its implementation are two
different things. Implementation requires the formulation of boundaries beyond
which the courts may not venture.
This article examines the ways in which the courts have re-defined some of the
requirements to be established in an application for judicial review in assuming a
greater supervisory jurisdiction over the exercise of power. For this purpose,
attention is focused on the criteria being applied by the courts in establishing
jurisdiction to review the exercise of power and on the effect that the existence of a
contract may have on establishing that jurisdiction.
II. JURISDICTION
Under the old prerogative writ system, whether a matter was sufficiently public so
as to attract the supervisory jurisdiction was tested by reference to the source of the
power being exercised. Section 29 of the Supreme Court Act 1981provides that
the High Court shall have jurisdiction to make orders of mandamus, prohibition
and certiorari in those classes of cases in which it had power to do so immediately
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before the passing of the Act. Thus the new procedure of an application for judicial
review, laid down by Order 53 and section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981,did
not alter the jurisdictional requirements of the prerogative writs, but merely
provided that relief in respect of them could only be obtained by way of an
application for judicial review under Order 53.
Under the new procedure the source of the power remained, at least initially, the
decisive test. The existence of statutory power was treated as the touchstone, I
although later the existence of power deriving from the Royal prerogative was
added as a source.2 Likewise, the exercise of power by non-statutory bodies like
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board - which was set up by the Royal
prerogative - has been held to be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction.3
The expansion of jurisdiction by determining it according to a consideration of
the nature of the power was heralded by what has become a landmark decision of
the English Court of Appeal. The case ofR. v.Panel of Take-overs andMergers, ex
parte Data/in p.l. c., 4 concerning a decision of the Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers (the "Panel"), is well-known.s The Panel is an unincorporated
association. It has no statutory, prerogative or common law powers. It
promulgates and polices the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers - the body of
rules that members of the Stock Exchange are expected to obey in making
take-over bids. In effect, it wields a decision-making power of life or death, as
offenders against the Code - as determined by the Panel- can be banned from the
Stock Exchange. The Panel is a self-regulating body in the sense that it connotes a
system whereby a group of people, acting in concert, use their collective power to
force themselves and others to comply with a code of conduct of their own
devising.6 The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Donaldson, described the Panel as
performing its functions without visible or direct means oflegal support, although
1. H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law 6th ed. (1988), p. 629.
2. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374.
3. R. v. Criminal Injun'es Compensation Board, ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864.
4. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564.
5. A. 1. M. Tompkins, "Judicial Review and the Public Domain", [1987] N.Z.L.R. 120; Lord
Alexander of Weedon, "Judicial Review and City Regulators", [1989] 52M.L.R. 640; C. F. Forsyth,
"The Scope ofJudicial Review: 'Public Duty' Not 'Source of Power"', [1987] P.L. 356; H. W. R.
Wade, "New Vistas of Judicial Review", (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 323; L. Hilliard, "The Take-over Panel
and the Courts", [1987] 50 M.L.R. 372; G. A. Smith, "Public Duty and Private Power in
Administrative Law", (1990) 40 University of Toronto Law Journal 412; A. C. Hutchinson, "Mice
Under a Chair; Democracy, Courts and the Administrative State", (1990) 40 University of Toronto Law
Journal 374; D. Oliver, "Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?", [1987] P.L. 543; D.
Pannick, "Who is Subject to Judicial Review and in Respect of What?", [1992]P.L. 1; H. W. R. Wade,
"Beyond the Law: A British Innovation in Judicial Review", 43 Admin. L. Rev. 559; P. Cane, 'Self
Regulation and Judicial Review", (1987) 6 Civil Justice Quarterly 324; J. Beatson, "The Courts and the
Regulators", (1987) 3 Professional Negligence 121; S. K. M. Wong, "Judicial Review: Power and Public
Functions", (1987) 131 S.J. 1674; H. Woolf, "Judicial Review: A Possible Programme for Reform",
[1992] P.L. 221; C. Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public Law (1992), p. 31 et seq..
6. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564, 567 per Sir John Donaldson MR.
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he noted that there is abundant invisible or indirect support.7 In particular, the
background matrix of governmental involvement and statutory backing wasnoted
to include: (1) the unspoken assumption that the Department of Trade and
Industry, the Stock Exchange or other appropriate body would in fact exercise
statutory or other contractual powers to penalise transgressors of the Code; (2)
statutory powers able to be exercised by the Bank of England in the event of a
breach of the Code; (3) the fact that the Governor of the Bank of England appoints
both the Panel's chairman and deputy chairman; and (4) its origins of
establishment by the Bank of England. With a consideration of these and other
criteria discussed below, the Master of the Rolls and Lloyd LJ spoke of a test of
jurisdiction which was, it seems, to be regarded as one of general application.
Rejecting the Panel's argument that jurisdiction for judicial review extends only to
bodies whose power is derived from legislation or the Royal prerogative, the
Master of the Rolls said, in what has become a frequently cited passage, that:8
"Possibly the only essential elements are what can be described as a public
element, which can take many different forms, and the exclusion from the
jurisdiction of bodies whose sole source of power is a consensual submission
to its jurisdiction."
Addressing the question in terms of the source and nature of the power, Lloyd
LJ said:9
"I do not agree that the source of the power is the sole test whether a body
is subjectto judicial review.... Of course the source of the power will often,
perhaps usually, be decisive. If the source of power is a statute, or
subordinate legislation under statute, then clearly the body in question will
be subject to judicial review. If, at the other end of the scale, the source of
power is contractual, as in the case of private arbitration, then clearly the
arbitrator is not subject to judicial review ...
But in between these two extremes there is an area in which it is helpful to
look not just at the source of the power but at the nature of the power. If the
body in question is exercising public law functions, or if the exercise of its
functions have public law consequences, then that may, as counsel for the
applicants submitted, be sufficient to bring the body within the reach of
judicial review."
The courts have been prepared to apply both the source and nature of the power
7. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564,574.
8. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564, 577.
9. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564, 583.
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tests. If jurisdiction is established by one or the other, then that will be sufficient. 10
But in a growing number of cases the nature of the power test has been applied as if
it alone were the test of general application, 11 and this is to be welcomed. It marks
the taking of amore flexible approach to the whole question of jurisdiction and, in
particular, the application of a functional analysis of the wider constitutional role
of bodies whose decisions are sought to be challenged in this way.
A recent Court of Appeal decision attempts to narrow the scope of application of
the nature of the power test inDatafin. In R. v.Disciplinary Committee of theJockey
Club, ex parte His Highness The AgaKhanl2 the Court of Appeal was called upon to
decide whether a decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club
disqualifying the applicant's horse under the Rules of Racing could be challenged
by way of judicial review. It was accepted that a contract existed between the
applicant and the Jockey Club under which the former agreed to be bound by the
latter's Rules of Racing. The Court of Appeal held that the decision could not be
challenged by way of judicial review. The reasons given for the decision are
examined below, but for present purposes it is sufficient to note that the Court of
Appeal was of the view that jurisdiction under the principle inDatafin would only
be appropriate where what is being exercised is "governmental" power. Quite why
"governmental" power should differ from power which is sufficiently public is
difficult to see. The Court did not attempt to describe the attributes of
governmental power, except to say that the Panel was exercising governmental
power because it was woven into the fabric of public regulation,13 whereas the
Jockey Club was not. What is required, according to Hoffmann LJ, is that the
body in question be a "surrogate organ of government", 14and that this might be
10. InR. v. Royal Life Saving Society, exparteHowe(unreported, Court of Appeal, 15May 1990, Lloyd
and McCowan LJJ, and Sir John Megaw, LEXIS) Lloyd LJ stated that, since Datafin, there have been
two separate tests for jurisidiction - the nature of the power and the source of the power. Both were
applied in that case in deciding the question of jurisdiction; Stuart-Smith LJ in R. v .Jockey Club, ex parte
R.A.M. Race-coursesLtd. (1991) 3 Admin.L.R. 265,290 said: " ... each case will depend on the source
of powers and nature of functions of the body and whether there is a sufficient public element
involved."
II. InR. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin.L.R. 609 (Q.B.D.) Neill LJ was
of the view that it is the public element in the relevant body's decision rather than the source from
which its powers are derived which is likely to provide the surest answer to the question whether the
decisions of that body can be reviewed by the process of judicial review. In R. v. Civil Service Appeal
Board, ex parte Bruce [1988] 3 All E.R. 686 (Q.B.D.) May LJ stated at p. 961 that the test ofa sufficient
public element, which focuses on the nature of the power, as laid down in Datafin, was a general test for
application in all cases of judicial review, whether concerning powers whose source is statutory,
prerogative or otherwise. Similarly, Auld J inR. v. The Imam of Bury Park Jame Masjid Luton, Abdul
Bari and Others, ex parte Sulaiman Ali (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 30 August 1991, LEXIS)
said that the essential qualification for judicial review of the exercise of a power was its public element.
This statement, it seems, was to be regarded as one of general application.
12. Unreported, Court of Appeal, transcript of the draft judgments of 4 December 1992 (unrevised),
Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Farquharson and Hoffmann LJJ, (references to page numbers refer to the
page number of the appropriate separately numbered judgment being referred to).
13. Per Sir Thomas Bingham MR, at p. 17.
14. At p. 4.
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indicated by a delegation of power from government of some sort - in other words,
a "privatisation of the business of government itself' .15
The distinction that the Court of Appeal attempted to draw between public and
governmental power is problematic and should be resisted. Although it is true that
the Panel could be said to be exercising governmental power, the Court of Appeal
in Datafin did not seek to make a distinction between public and governmental
power, and indeed Sir John Donaldson MR in that case said that all that might be
required was a public element. The decision in Datafin has given the courts a
flexible tool by which to make an analysis, at a functional level, of the true nature of
the exercise of power and it would be regrettable indeed if that were to be
narrowed in its scope of application in the way suggested by the Court of Appeal in
The Aga Khan.
What is meant by the "nature of the power"? WoolfLJ considered its meaning
in R. v.Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble. 16 He statedl? that the approach
which the courts now adopt is to look at the subject-matter of the decision which it
is suggested should be subject to judicial review, and the actual, factual application
of the decision-making power. In effect, the "nature" of a power means the
"public nature" of a power. The public nature of a power is tested by whether
there is a "sufficient public element". As to the meaning of a "sufficient public
element", Dillon LJ in McLaren v. The Home Officel8 equated it with "rights
under public law". InR. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble19 Dillon LJ
said that the "public element may take the form of a public right on one side, or a
public duty on the other side, but there must be a public element." Whether there
is a sufficient public element is assessed by reference to anumber of criteria which
the courts apply in carrying out what is essentially a qualitative assessment of the
"publicness" of the power being exercised. Time and again the courts have
emphasised that these criteria are not, of themselves, conclusive of jurisdiction. 20
Ultimately, whether the courts are prepared to extend jurisdiction under the
nature of the power test is a question of public policy. This was explicitly
recognised in Datafin itself, where Lloyd LJ said that he was not persuaded that
15. Per Hoffmann LJ, at p. 3.
16. [1990] I.R.L.R. 332 (C.A.).
17. At p. 336.
18. [1990] I.R.L.R. 338,339.
19. [1990] I.R.L.R. 332,337.
20. R. v. Code of Practice Committee of fhe Bn'fish Pharmaceuficallndusfry, ex parfe Professional
Counselling Aids Lfd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 697, 718per Popplewell J: "There is no one test which is
decisive.";R. v,Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2Admin L.R. 609,per Neill LJ at pp.
624-625: "It is plain that in order to determine whether the decisions of a particular body can be
reviewed by the process of judicial review it is not always sufficient to apply a single test.", and per Roch
J at p. 628: "I would suggest that these tests are no more than tools used by the courts to reach a
resolution of the fundamental question, and further that no one test is necessarily decisive."; R. v.
Derbyshire COUntyCouncil, ex parte Noble [1990] I.R.L.R. 332, 334per Woolf LJ: "Unfortunately in my
view there is no universal test which will be applicable to all circumstances which will indicate clearly
and beyond peradventure as to when judicial review is or is not available."
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there were compelling policy arguments against review of the Panel's decisions.21
What follows is an examination of the types of criteria that the courts are likely
to take into account, together with observations as to their relative significance.
1. Nature of the body
There are several statements by the courts to the effect that both the body and its
decision must be of a sufficient public character in order for the decision to be able
to be challenged.22 However, other cases reject this view and suggest tht it is only
the decision (or the exercise of power) that need have a sufficient public element. 23
In The Aga Khan the Court of Appeal unfortunately concentrated to a large extent
on the legal status and characteristics of the Jockey Club, rather than taking a
qualitative analysis of the nature of the power it exercises, in deciding that
jurisdiction was not established to challenge the decision to disqualify. Sir Thomas
Bingham MR was of the view that jurisdiction was not established because the
Jockey Club was not in its origin, history, constitution or membership a public
body. With respect, this approach represents an unfortunate re-assertion of a more
formalistic way of assessing the public character of the exercise of power. Why
should the legal characteristics of the body itself dictate the nature of the power it
exercises? As Hoffmann LJ in The Aga Khan himself acknowledged, 24there "is no
reason why a private club should not also exercise public powers." While it cannot
be disputed that no decision stands in a vacuum separately from the body that
makes it,25 the better view is that the test created by Datafin and the cases that
follow it is a nature of the power test. It is not a nature of the body and power test.
For that reason a more qualitative approach to the nature of the power exercised by
the Jockey Club would have been preferable.
However, it is appropriate to have regard to the nature of the body in assessing
the sufficiency of the public element where the status of the body 'flavours' the
decision. Criteria of this type include such matters as whether the body is self-
regulatory and whether it has dejure authority. Whether a body is self-regulatory26
21. [1987] I All E.R. 564,582.
22. R. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Ma5singberd-Mundy (1990) 2Admin L.R. 609, at p. 627per Neill LJ;R.
v. The Football Association Ltd., ex parle The Foolball League Ltd. (unreported, Queen's Bench
Division, 31 July 1991, Rose J, LEXIS); R. v. Fernhill Manor School, ex parte Brown (unreported,
Queen's Bench Division, 22 May 1992, Brooke J, LEXIS). In The Aga Khan one of the reasons the
Court of Appeal gave for holding that jurisdiction to review a decision of the Jockey Club was not
established was that it was not in its origin, history, constitution or, least of all, its membership a public
body.
23. R. v. Jockey Club, ex parte R.A.M. Race-courses Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin.L.R. 265, at pp. 294-295
per Simon Brown J.
24. At p. 1.
25. R. v. The FOOlball AssocialionLtd., ex parte The Football League LId. (unreported, Queen's Bench
Division, 31 July 1991, Rose J, LEXIS).
26. See P. Cane, "Self Regulation and Judicial Review", (1987) 6 CivilJuslice Quarlerly 324; A. Page,
"Self Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension", [1986]49M.L.R. 141;J. Beatson, "The Courts and
the Regulators", (1987) 3 Professional Negligence 121; P. Bovey, "Company Law Lecture - Self
Regulation", (1991) 12Co. Law. 3.
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is a criterion which has, on occasion, pointed to there being a sufficient public
element. Self-regulation in this context was defined in Datafin to mean "a system
whereby a group of people, acting in concert, use their collective power to force
themselves and others to comply with a code of conduct of their own devising. "27
Lloyd LJ took the view that the Panel is a self-regulating body. He said that "the
word 'self-regulation' may be misleading. The [P]anel regulates not only itself, but
all others who have no alternative but to come into the market in a case to which the
code applies."28 The self-regulating character of many of the bodies which have
been subject to jurisdiction conferred by the standard of a sufficient public
element has been referred to in other cases also.29 Self-regulation in the sense
discussed is relevant only to the extent that it indicates that the rights of others are
affected by the exercise of power by a self-regulating body regardless of choice or
consent.
In Datafin, the Master of the Rolls observed that the Panel lacked any authority
de jure.30 In R. v. Committee of Advertising Practice, ex parte The Bradford
Exchange Ltd. 31 jurisdiction to review a decision of the Committee of Advertising
Practice was assumed for the reason that the Committee is "a self-appointed body,
with power which it arrogates to itself ... ". In assuming jurisdiction to review a
decision of the Advertising Standards Authority, Glidewell LJ in R. v. Advertising
Standards Authority, ex parte The Insurance Service p.l.c.32 noted that the
Authority has no powers granted to it by statute or at common law. Other clear
cases involving bodies which have no dejure authority but which were held subject
to the supervisory jurisdiction include R. v. General Council for the Bar, ex parte
Percival,33 R. v. Ethical Committee of St. Mary's Hospital (Manchester), ex parte
Harriott,34 and R. v. Code of Praaice Committee of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry, ex parte Personal Counselling Aids.35
2. Effect of code
What is meant by a 'code' in this context? A code means any system of rules which
governs a body's exercise of power. These rules can be wholly self-imposed and
able to be amended from time to time by the body itself, or they may be imposed by
a higher body or even by statute or regulation, and able to be amended subject to
requirements contained therein. A code may take the form of an unincorporated
association's regulatory guide as to the matters that will be taken into account and
27. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564, 567 per Sir John Donaldson MR.
28. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564, 582.
29. E.g., R. v. Chief Rabbi, ex parle Wachmann (1991) 3 Admin.L.R. 721, 727-728.
30. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564, 567.
31. Unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 31 July 1990, Kennedy J, LEXIS.
32. (1990) 2 Admin.L.R. 77 (Q.B.D.).
33. (I 990) 2 Admin.L.R. 711. See the discussion ofthis case by H. W. R. Wade, "Beyond the Law: A
British Innovation in Judicial Review", 43 Admin.L.Rev. 559,560-561.
34. [1988] 1 F.L.R. 512.
35. (1991) 3 Admin.L.R. 697.
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the procedure to be followed in making a decision,36 the memorandum and
articles of association (and any rules made under or incorporated into the same) of
a company incorporated under the Companies Act 1985 (and its antecedents),37 a
statement of objects of a trade association (whether incorporated or not),38 a Royal
charter39 and the like.
The general rule is that, in assessing whether the exercise of power has about it a
sufficient public element, the courts will examine the content and function of any
code which regulates the exercise of that power.40 Although beyond the scope of
this article, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that the content of a code is
also relevant to the grounds upon which a decision or exercise of power may be
challenged.
When will the courts have regard to the content and function of a code in
assessing the public element? The courts will have regard to the content of a code
when, say, it shows that a decision made under it was essentially one of religious
significance about which public law is not concerned.41 Sometimes, the courts will
36. R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin p.l.c. [1987] I All E.R. 564; R. v. Panel on
Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness p.l.c. [1989] I All E.R. 509.
37. Bank of Scotland v. Investment Management Regulatory Organisation Ltd. 1989 S.L.T. 432,
436; R. v. Advertising Standards Authority Ltd., ex parte The Insurance Service p.l.c. (1990) 2
Admin.L.R. 77.
38. Shearson Lehman Hulton Inc. v. Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd., J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd.
[1989] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 570. Although the matter at issue in Shearson was essentially a dispute in
private law as to contract, the case has public law implications: R. Goode, "The Concept and
Implications of a Market in Commercial Law", (1990) 24 Is.L.R. 185.
39. The courts will give some weight to the contents of a Royal charter as helping the courts to evaluate
the extent to which there is a public element about the power conferred: R. v.Jockey Club, ex parte
Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, at pp. 625-626 per Neill LJ. The courts will not accept
arguments to the effect that mere incorporation by Royal charter means that the power so conferred is
reviewable as being an exercise of the Royal prerogative: R. v .Jockey Club, ex parte M assingberd-M undy
(1990) 2 Admin L.R .. 609 per Neill LJ, at pp. 625-626, but a contrary view appears to be expressed by
Roch J in the same case atp. 629;R. v.Jockey Club, ex parteR.A.M. Race-coursesLtd. (1991) 3 Admin.
L. R. 265, at pp. 294-295 per Simon Brown J; R. v. Royal Life Saving Society, ex parte Howe
(unreported, Court of Appeal, IS May 1990,per Lloyd LJ, LEXIS); R. v. Disciplinary Committee of the
Jockey Club, ex parte His Highness the Aga Khan (unreported, Court of Appeal, transcript of the draft
judgments of 4 December 1992 (unrevised), Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Farquharson and Hoffmann
LJJ).
40. R. v. Football Association of Wales, ex parte Flint Town United Football Club (unreported, Queen's
Bench Division, II July 1990, Farquharson, LJ and Nolan J, LEXIS); R. v. Jockey Club, ex parte
Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, at pp. 625-626 per Neill LJ: "On the other hand an
examination of the Charter and of the powers conferred on the Jockey Club strongly suggest that in
some aspects of its work it operates in the public domain and that its functions are at least in part public
or quasi-public functions.";R. v.Jockey Club, ex parte R.A.M. Race-courses Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R.
265, at pp. 294-295 per Simon Brown J: " ... I agree that the incorporation of the Jockey Club under
charter with effect from 1970 cannot of itself be a decisive consideration in attracting the review
jurisdiction. On the other hand, I do not regard it as an irrelevance. Rather, it seems to me to indicate a
governmental (in the widest sense) recognition of the national importance of the Jockey Club's
position ... ",
41. R. v. The Imam of Bury Park Jame Masjid Luton, Abdul Bari and Others, ex parte Sulaiman Ali
(unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 30 August 1991, Auld J, LEXIS). Here Auld J had regard to the
provisions of a written constitution under which the decision challenged was made in deciding that the
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regard the function of a code as being that of constituting a contract between the
applicant and decision-maker. The extent to which the presence of a contract
negates jurisdiction is examined below, but for now it is sufficient to note that the
courts will sometimes regard a code which constitutes a contract in this way as
negativing the requisite public element.42
Codes which are in some way linked with statute or subject to informal
Departmental or Ministerial approval are likely to be accorded particular
importance with regard to their content and function. Thus inBank of Scotland v.
Investment Management Regulatory Organisation Ltd.,43 a Scottish case, Lord
Cullen in the Court of Session held that a company which was a self-regulating
organisation within the meaning of the Financial Services Act 1986was subject to
the supervisory jurisdiction. In finding a sufficient public element about the
exercise of power of waiver under its conduct of business rules (a code), Lord
Cullen had particular regard to the fact that the code was required, at a
Departmental or Ministerial level, to be in accordance with the requirements of
the Act, and that the code would inevitably bear a close relationship to the Act's
requirements. He also had regard to the close relationship between the company's
memorandum and articles of association and the purpose and terms of the Act.
Jurisdiction was conceded on appeal, but it is clear that there was agreement with
Lord Cullen's analysis in this regard.
3. Government involvement
The courts have regard to the extent of actual or potential government
involvement in assessing the sufficiency of the public element. Government
involvement in this sense means government recognition in the widest sense, and
will include such matters as the origin of establishment of the body, whether it or
its functioning is in any way under-pinned by statute, whether there has been an
express or implied devolution of power from government and a consideration of
whether the government would otherwise step in and carry out the functions of the
body in its absence. These are examined in turn.
In Datafin, one of the matters taken into consideration by both Lloyd and
Nicholls LJJ in conferring jurisdiction was the way in which the Panel came to be
established. In particular, the leading role played by the Bank of England in
setting up and running the Panel and the fact that the Governor of the Bank of
England appoints both the chairman and deputy were matters taken into account.
Similar!y, inR. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-M undy Roch J said44 that "the
courts will look at the source of the existence of the body concerned."
decision had an insufficient public element for purposes of jurisdiction, containing as it did matters of
religious significance which the court did not regard as of a public character.
42. E.g., R. v. Football Association of Wales, ex parte Flint Town United Football Club (unreported,
Queen's Bench Division, 11 July 1990, Farquharson LJ and Nolan J, LEXIS).
43. 1989 S.L.T. 432. See A. Mennie, "Jurisdiction and Competency in Proceedings for Judicial
. Review", 1990S.L. T. I.
44. (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, 628.
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The courts will regard an express or implied devolution of power from
government as a relevant factor in assessing the public element. In Datafin, Lloyd
LJ was of the view45 that in that case there was an implied devolution of
governmental power to the Panel. Sir John Donaldson MR referred to that
implied devolution as being that as "an act of government it was decided that, in
relation to take-overs, there should be a central self-regulating body ... ".46 He
also referred to "the express willingness of the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry to limit legislation in the field of takeovers and mergers and to use the
[P]anel as the centre-piece of his regulation in that market. "47 In The Aga Khan
Hoffmann LJ referred to those bodies like the Panel, the Advertising Standards
Authority and Investment Management Regulatory Organisation Ltd. - all of
which have been subject to judicial review on Datafin principles - and said that
they are the result of the "privatisation of the business of government itself. "48 He
said that the same could not be said of the Jockey Club, and for that reason, among
others, its decisions were not reviewable. This approach is to be compared with
that taken in the Australian case ofForbes v.New South Wales Trolling Club Ltd .. 49
This was a case not concerning judicial review but it has been subsequently
interpreted in Australia as authority relevant to the issue of jurisdiction for judicial
review.50 One factor which the High Court considered relevant in deciding that
the requirements of the rules of natural justice applied was that the Club
controlled trotting in New South Wales by the tacit consent of governmentY
In relation to an express devolution of power from government, an obvious
example that comes to mind is the process of privatisation. Where there is an
express devolution of power in this way, it could be that the nature of the power
remains essentially public notwithstanding a change in the body which exercises
it. Much will depend on the extent to which government remains involved in the
decision-making of the privatised industries and whether regulatory power has
been delegated to them in this way.
In assessing the sufficiency of the public element, the courts have developed a
"but for" test relating to potential government intervention or involvement: "but
for the fact that the relevant body is regulating the activities of others in a
particular field, would the government otherwise intervene and regulate that
45. [1987] I All E.R. 564,585.
46. [1987] I All E.R. 564,574.
47. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564, 577.
48. At p. 3.
49. 143 C.L.R. 242 (High Court of Australia).
50. "Sydney" Training Depot Snapper Island Ltd. v. Brown (1987) 14 A.L.D. 464 (Federal Court of
Australia); Della-Vedova andAnotherv. State Energy Commission of Western Australia (1990) 2 W.A.R.
561, 568 per Ipp J (Supreme Court of Western Australia); S. D. Hotop, Principles of Australian
Administrative Law 6th ed. (The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1985), pp. 271-272.
51. 143 C.L.R. 242, at p. 262 per Gibbs J.
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activity?"52 Thus, of relevance is whether government would otherwise enact
legislation to regulate the area in question. 53Also relevant is whether a government
department would otherwise intervene to regulate the area or to set up a public
body to do so. 54Thus in The Aga Khan a majority55 of the Court of Appeal were of
the view that if the Jockey Club were dissolved there is nothing to suggest that the
government would set up a statutory body to regulate racing, and that this was one
reason why the decision was not amenable to judicial review. However, it should
be borne in mind that actual or potential government involvement or intervention
is not an essential requirement for the establishment of a sufficient public
element, 56although of course it will greatly add weight to the applicant's case.
Other criteria in combination may equally confer jurisdiction. Moreover, the
efficacy of a "but for" test for potential government involvement is at least
doubtful. Why should the jurisdiction of the court depend on a hypothesis as to
what government would do but for the existence of the body in question?57
The correlative of the "but for" test would appear to be "was government
formerly controlling or regulating the activity?" If so, why should it not be the case
that the courts retain a supervisory jurisdiction in respect of that activity upon its
delegation when it remains sufficiently public? Such an approach is suggestive of
the view that power formerly exercised by government and since delegated by way
of privatisation might come within the supervisory jurisdiction.
52.R. v. ChiefRabbl~ exparte Wachmann(1991)3 Admin. L.R. 721, 727-728perSimon BrownJ: "And
certainly it is a feature of all these cases that, were there no self-regulatory body in existence, Parliament
would almost inevitably intervene to control the activity in question."; D. Pannick, "Who is Subject to
Judicial Review and in Respect of What?", [1992]P.L. 1,5-6.
53. InR. v, Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachmann (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 721,727-728, in holdingthatthere
was an insufficient public element for jurisdiction to review a decision of the Chief Rabbi, Simon
Brown J took into account that it cannot be suggested that "but for his offices the government would
impose a statutory regime." This was also one of the reasons why jurisdiction in respect of a decision of
an Imam was refused in R. v. The Imam of Bury Park Jame Masjid Luton, Abdul Bari and Others, ex
parte Sulaiman Ali (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 30 August 1991, Auld J, LEXIS). In R. v.
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin p.l.c. [1987] I All E.R. 564,574 the Master of the
Rolls said that no one could have been in the least surprised if the Panel had been instituted and
operated under the direct authority of statute law. In R. v. Jockey Club, ex parte R.A .M. Race-courses
Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin L.R. 265, at pp. 294-295 Simon Brown J stated that one factor pointing to
jurisdiction is whether the powers so exercised "could as well have been eshrined in legislation."
54. In R. v.Advertising Standards A uthon'ty Ltd., ex parte Thelnsurance Service p.l. c. (1990) 2 Admin,
L.R. 77,86 one reason for the conferral of jurisdiction over the decisions ofthe Advertising Standards
Authority was that "it is clearly exercising a public law function which, ifthe Authority did not exist,
would no doubt be exercised by the Director General of Fair Trading." In R. v. The Football
AssociationLtd., ex parte The Football League Ltd. (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 31 July 1991,
Rose J, LEXIS), Rose J stated that, in Datafin, one of the reasons for the conferral of jurisdiction in
respect of the Panel was that, "but for its existence, the State would create a public body to perform its
functions. "
55. Farquharson and Hoffmann LJJ.
56. R. Gordon, "Judicial Review", (1992) 136S.J. 109.
57. D. Pannick, "Who is Subject to Judicial Review and in Respect of What?", [1992]P.L. 1,5-6.
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In assessing the sufficiency of the public element, the courts have given
particular weight to whether the establishment or functioning of the body, or the
exercise or enforcement of its powers of decision, are in any sense supported or
under-pinned by statute or regulation. 58For example, the extent of statutory
under-pinning is considered to be a highly relevant factor in deciding whether
there is a sufficient public element for purposes of judicial review in cases of
employment by the Crown,59and in the case of The Aga Khan one of the reasons
given for why jurisdiction was not established was because the Jockey Club had
largely escaped mention in the statute books. Moreover, the Court of Appeal
stressed the fact that the Jockey Club had not been woven into any system of
governmental control of horse racing - it had not been "woven into the fabric of
public regulation." Sometimes there will be sufficient public element if a code
(under which there is contained a power the exercise of which is subject to
challenge) is under-pinned by, or reflects the requirements of, a statute.60
The under-pinning must relate to the matter at issue in the application for
review if it is to be regarded as of any weight when considering the sufficiency of
the public element.61 The reason why the statutory under-pinning is required to
relate to the matter at issue is because the nature of the power test focuses on the
public character of the exercise of power and not on the public character of the
body exercising that power. Statutory under-pinning of the body itself may not
relate in any real sense to the power it exercises. It is statutory under-pinning of
the exercise of power that is relevant. It is possible to envisage a situation where the
58. In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin p.l.c. [1987] 1 All E.R. 564,574 the
Master of the Rolls noted that the Panel was "supported and sustained by a periphery of statutory
powers and penalties ... ". InR. v. Chief Rabbi, exparre Wachmann (1991)3Admin. L.R. 721,727-728
Simon Brown J said: "In other words, where non-governmental bodies have hitherto been held
reviewable, they have generally been operating as an integral part of a regulatory system which,
although itself non-statutory, is nevertheless supported by statutory powers and penalties clearly
indicative of government concern." In R. v. The Imam of Bury ParkJame Masjid Lucan, A bdu/ Ban' and
Ochers, exparce Sulaiman Ali (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 30August 1991,Auld,J. LEXIS),
one reason for refusing jurisdiction was that there wasno statutory under-pinning. A similar result for a
similar reason was reached by Rose J inR. v. The Football Association Ltd., ex parte The Football League
Ltd. (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 31 July 1991, Rose J, LEXIS). See also R. v. Fernhill
Manor School, ex parte Brown (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 22May 1992,Brooke J, LEXIS).
59. E.g., R. v. East Berkshire Health Aurhority, ex parte Walsh [1984] I.R.L.R. 278, at p. 280 per Sir
John Donaldson MR; R. v. Secretary of Stateforrhe Home Departmem, ex parte Benwell [1985] 1Q.B.
554, at p. 573 per Hodgson J.
60. Bank of Scotland v. Investmem Managemem Regulatory Organisation Limited 1989S.L.T. 432. For a
casewhere a code was not sufficiently under-pinned by statute, so that the requisite public element was
not established, seeR. v. The Independent Broadcasting Authority, ex parte the Rank Organisation p.l.c.
(unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 March 1986,May and Lloyd LJJ and Sir John Megaw, LEXIS).
61. InR. v.Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble [1990] I.R.L.R. 332, at p. 334WoolfLJ said, in
the context of an application for review of a decision by a council to dismiss the applicant from his
employment, that statutory under-pinning which relates to the right to dismiss can be significant in
indicating that the employment is of the category where judicial review may be available. At p. 335
WoolfLJ stated that although there was a statutory under-pinning in the present case, it did not relate
to dismissal and so of itself was insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
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exercise of one type of power (say, financial expenditure and borrowing by a body)
might be under-pinned by statute, while the exercise of another of the body's
powers (say, the power to discipline members) may be wholly free from statutory
under-pinning. The under-pinning of the former would be irrelevant in any
assessment of the sufficiency of any public element in any challenge to the exercise
of the latter.
Statutory under-pinning relevant to the matter at issue is not an essential or
necessary criterion for the establishment of jurisdiction.62 Other criteria in
combination can be sufficient to establish the requisite public element. Nor is
statutory under-pinning (which is relevant to the matter at issue) conclusive of
there being a sufficient public element.63 Other criteria may be required to be
present.
4. Power
It is becoming increasingly clear that important considerations in deciding
whether the exercise of power has about it a sufficient public element are the scope
or magnitude of that power, whether its exercise has national or international
significance and whether its exercise will otherwise remain unchecked in the sense
that it creates a monopoly for the body exercising it. These considerations are
examined in turn.
"It has been said that 'it is excellent to have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous
to use it like agiant'. "64 In Datafin Lloyd LJ, in holding that there was jurisdiction
in respect of the Panel's decisions, pointed to the fact that the Panel wields
enormous power. This suggests that it is the aggregation of power which, in part,
gives its exercise a public character. However, in The Aga Khan Hoffmann LJ said
that the fact that the Jockey Club has power, even over a substantial area of
economic activity, is not enough to make its decison-making public. In a mixed
economy, he said, power may be private as well as public. Private power may affect
the public interest and the livelihoods ofmany individuals but, in Hoffmann LJ's
view, that does not subject it to the rules of public law. The other judgments do not
address the issue, and Hoffmann LJ's view appears to be inconsistent with the
reasoning in Datafin. While it is true that the fact of power without more (say, an
element of control in the regulatory sense) may be insufficient to establish
jurisdiction, it should be a factor which the courts take into account. The High
Court of Australia has soughtto do this inForbes v.New South Wales Trotting Club'
Ltd .. 65 This was a case involving a challenge by the plaintiff against a decision of
62. In R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble [1990] I.R.L.R. 332,335 Woolf LJ accepted as
correct that cases since R. v. East Berkshire Health Authority, ex parte Walsh [1984] I.R.L.R. 278
establish that there can be jurisdiction for judicial review even though there is no statutory under-
pinning of any sort involved.
63. R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble [1990] I.R.L.R. 332, at p. 334 per Woolf LJ.
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the respondent Trotting Club warning him off race-courses controlled by it. The
plaintiff sought a declaration that the resolution under which the warning off was
carried out was ultra vires and void on the ground that there has been no
compliance with the rules of natural justice - he had not been given an opportunity
to be heard before the resolution was passed. The High Court held that the rules of
natural justice applied to the exercise of power. What is of interest about the case is
the view of Gibbs and Murphy IIthat the Trotting Club was not in the same
position as a private landowner. Murphy J said:66
"When rights are so aggregated that their exercise affects members of the
public to a significant degree, they may often be described as public rights
and their exercise as that of public power. Such public power must be
exercised bona fide, for the purposes for which it is conferred and with due
regard to the persons affected by its exercise .... There is a difference
between public and private power but, of course, one may shade into the
other. When rights are exercised directly by the government or by some
agency or some body vested with statutory authority, public power is
obviously being exercised, but it may be exercised in ways which are not so
obvious."
Murphy J held that the Trotting Club was exercising public power and that, in
consequence, it could not arbitrarily exclude or remove the plaintiff from race-
courses.67 Although Forbes concerned the applicability of the rules of natural
justice, subsequent Australian cases have treated it as relevant to the question of
jurisdiction for judicial review.68 The distinction it makes between public and
private power has also been approved,69 obiter, in Australia - although not yet
applied.
If the magnitude and aggregation of power are criteria relevant in assessing the
66. 143 c.L.R. 242, 275.
67. 143 C.L.R. 242, at p. 276 per Murphy J: "When one departs from the purely domestic area of
householder and from contracts affecting only individuals, into the sphere where there is an
accumulation of rights the exercise ofwhich affects the public to a significant degree, then increasingly,
requirements of due process are imposed and arbitrary and unreasonable conduct is not permitted.
This approach has been taken to monopolies, contracts in restraint of trade, as well as to statutory
authorities. It has also been taken to the conduct of trade unions and clubs in dealing with their
members. The question is where the line is to be drawn between public power which requires
observance of due process and private power which does not .... The stage has been reached where the
exercise of power to exclude a person indefinitely from a race-course should be treated as public power
subject to due process."
68. E.g., Del/a-Vedova and Another v. State Energy Commission of Western Australia (1990) 2 W.A.R.
561, at p. 568 per Ipp J (Supreme Court of Western Australia); S. D. Hotop, Principles of Australian
Administrative Law 6th ed. (The Law Book Company Ltd., Sydney, 1985), pp. 271-272.
69. Del/a-Vedova and Another v. State Energy Commission of Western AustraJia (1990) 2W.A.R. 561, at
p. 568perIpp J (Supreme Court of Western Australia); Gerhardy v.Brown 159c.L.R. 70, at p. 107per
Murphy J; "Sydney" Training Depot Snapper Island Ltd. v. Brown (1987) 14 A.L.p. 464 (Federal
Court of Australia).
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public character of the exercise of power, it is possible to envisage a whole new
range of powers which now might be subject to control by the supervisory
jurisdiction. Private and public companies wield enormous power and their
decisions may affect the public, say, environmentally or economically. Is the
exercise of power by such bodies now open to challenge on this basis? The
development of a principle of administrative law to control the exercise of power,
whose public character originates solely from the aggregation of power, is still in
its infancy. Limits will have to be set.
The courts have stated70 that whether the body exercising the power is in a
position of major national importance is to be taken into account in assessing the
sufficiency of the public element. In Datafin this criterion was not specifically
referred to, and only later cases have interpreted Datafin as according weight to
this criterion.? 1The importance to be accorded to this criterion was illustrated by a
New Zealand Court of Appeal decision decided prior to Datafin. In Finnigan v.
New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc.72 the plaintiffs, who were not members of
the defendant Union, sought a declaration that the defendant's decision to send a
New Zealand representative rugby football team to tour South Africa was invalid
and unlawful and not made in accordance with the defendant's rules, and an
injunction to prevent the defendant implementing the decision. The proceedings
were by way of action and not by way of application for judicial review.
Nevertheless, the case has considerable relevance in the public law context, given
that the defendant was treated as essentially a public body, that standing was
accorded by analogy (and possibly by direct application) with public law principles,
that one of the grounds of challenge subsequently applied by the High Court in the
same case73 was akin to a public law ground of challenge, and that the High Court
applied a "nature of the power" test.74 As the case did not proceed by way of
application for judicial review under the New Zealand equivalent to Order 53,75
the Court of Appeal did not address the question of jurisdiction and the sufficiency
of any public element. That question was, in effect, subsumed within a
consideration of the wider question as to whether the plaintiffs had standing to
70. R. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, at p. 628 per Roch J.
71. R. v. The Football Association Ltd., ex parte The Football League Ltd. (unreported, Queen's Bench
Division, 31 July 1991, Rose J, LEXIS): " ... the ratio of [Data/in] is that a body may be subject to
judicial review if it regulates an important aspect of national life ... ".
72. [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 159. See P. R. A. Cullum, "The Missed Match", 1990S.L. T. 25; A. I. M.
Tompkins, "Judicial Review and the Public Domain", [1987] N.ZLJ. 120; M. R. Bowman,
"Standing to Challenge the Tour", 5 A. U.L.R. 389; I. Eagles, "Public Law and Private
Corporations", [1986]CLJ. 406; S. L. Watt, "Finnigan v.N.Z.R.F. U.: Judicial Handling of Political
Controversy", (1991) 21 V. U. W.L.R. 147; A. C. Hutchinson, "Mice Under a Chair: Democracy,
Courts and the Administrative State", (1990) 40 University 0/ Toromo Law Joumal374; D. Oliver, "Is
the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?", [1987]P.L. 543.
73. Finnigan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc (No.2) [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 181, at pp. 186-187
per Casey J.
74. Ibid., per Casey J.
75. Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (New Zealand).
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bring proceedings against the defendant. In holding that the plaintiffs did have
sufficient standing Cooke J, who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal,
took into account the fact that the decision of the defendant affected the New
Zealand community as a whole and the international relations or standing of New
Zealand. He said:76
"While technically a private and voluntary sporting association, the Rugby
Union is in relation to this decision in a position of major national
importance, for the reasons already outlined. In this particular case,
therefore, we are not willing to apply to the question of standing the
narrowest of criteria that might be drawn from private law fields. In truth
the case has some analogy with public law issues."
Even where a body holds a position of major national importance this alone will
not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction in the absence of other criteria. 77This much
is clear from the Court of Appeal's reasoning in The Aga Khan, where it was
specifically acknowledged that the Jockey Club was regulating a national activity
but that this was not sufficient in the absence of a "governmental" dimension to
the regulatory function.
Closely associated with the relevance of the magnitude of the power is the idea
that the courts will take into account whether, in exercising the power subject to
challenge, a body is securing for itself a monopoly.78What is meant by monopoly?
It means that, if a person wishes to take part in a particular activity, then he or she
has no alternative but to accept the jurisdiction of the body. Put another way, it
means that there isno effective choice but to accept the scrutiny, control and terms
and conditions imposed by the relevant body in entering the activity.
Consideration was given to the existence of a monopolised market inR. v. Lloyd's
of London, ex parte Briggs. 79Here one of the reasons the Court gave for the view
that Lloyd's of London was not exercising a public power in regulating the
insurance market was that it was not regulating the whole market, but merely one
section of it (Lloyd's powers are derived from a private Act which does not extend
to any persons in the insurance business other than those who wish to operate in
the section of the market governed by Lloyd's). In The Aga Khan the fact that the
Jockey Club had an effective monopoly over the control of racing was not, of itself,
76. [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 159, 178-179.
77. E.g., inR. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, at p. 630 Roch J
recognised that the Jockey Club holds a position of major national importance, but jurisdiction was not
conferred.
78. This criterion was not referred to in Dam/in itself. Subsequent cases have pointed to its relevance:
R. v.JockeyClub, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, atpp. 628-630 per RochJ;R.
v.JockeyClub, ex parteR.A.M. Race-courses Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 265, per Stuart-Smith LJ atp.
268 and per Simon Brown J at pp. 293-295.
79. Unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 17 July 1992, Leggatt LJ and Popplewell J, LEXIS.
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sufficient to establish jurisdiction. It seems that the monopoly would have had to
have been conferred or enforced by government for it to be relevant.
There are a number of cases not involving judicial review where the courts have
intervened to control the exercise of power in reliance on monopoly
considerations. Nagle v. Feilden80 was a case where the plaintiff had brought an
action against the defendants claiming a declaration that the practice of Jockey
Club stewards of refusing a trainer's licence to women was void as against public
policy and an injunction to order the granting of such a licence. The plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeal in respect of a decision to strike out the statement
of claim and to dismiss the action. The Court of Appeal over-turned the striking
out and the dismissal. Lord Denning was of the view that the Jockey Club was an
authority exercising a virtual monopoly in an important field of human activity. Of
such authorities he said:B1
"When these authorities exercise a predominant power over the exercise of a
trade or profession, the courts may have jurisdiction to see that this power is
not abused."
The case has been subsequently followed.82 This line of authority has sometimes
been confined to the issue of the 'right to work', which is said to be in the same
category as cases dealing with the restraint of trade.
It is clear from the case law that, even where there is monopolised power, this of
itself is not necessarily conclusive of jurisdiction. What is required is for the
monopoly to be conferred, enforced or supported by government for it to have the
necessary public character. One can think of the monopolies held by the privatised
industries which are enforced by governmental licensing and regulatory agencies.
Is the decision-making by companies operating these industries, like the
electricity generating and supply companies, sufficiently public so as to establish
jurisdiction when they exercise monopolised power of this kind?
5. Relations with subjects
A sufficient public element cannot be found merely by equating that phrase with
the public interest.B3 Still less can it be found by taking the public interest in the
80. [1966] 2 Q.B. 633.
81. [1966] 2 Q.B. 633, 647.
82. McInnes v. Onslow Fane and Another [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1520;Cheall v. Association of Professional,
Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff [1982] 3 All E.R. 855; Watson v. Prager and Another [1991] 1
W.L.R.726.
83. R. v. ChiefRabbl~ ex parte Wachmann(1991)3 Admin. L.R. 721, atpp. 727-728 per Simon Brown Jj
R. v.East Berkshire Health Authority, ex parte Walsh [1984] I.R.L.R. 278,per Sir John Donaldson MR
at p. 280,per May LJ at p. 283,per Purchas LJ at p. 285;R. v.Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble
[1990] I.R.L.R. 332, at p. 337 per Dillon LJ; R. v. The Football Association Ltd., ex parte The Football
League Ltd. (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 31 July 1991, Rose J, LEXIS).
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sense of "well, the newspapers will make something of it."84What is relevant is if
the rights of subjects are affected by the exercise of power. 85The courts will take
into account the number of subjects affected by the exercise of the power or
decision,86particularly if they are not parties to it.8? A crucial distinction in this
context wasmade by Roch J inR. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Munday. He
saw88the question as whether the exercise of power "affects the applicant's rights
qua subject, or [affects] the applicant's rights in a waywhich is peculiar to him or to
a limited class of persons?" This distinction has been subsequently followed.89
Thus, where a decision affects only the applicant or everyone in a limited class to
which he or she belongs, this will not be sufficient for purposes of the requisite
public element. It is only where the decision affects the applicant's rights in the
same way that it affects rights of other subjects that that is relevant to the
sufficiency of the public element. This reasoning, although not made explicit in
The AgaKha, underlies that decision. The applicant was attempting to challenge a
decision which was personal to him and which could not be said to have wider
significance for the public.
What kind of "rights affected" are relevant in asking whether the exercise of
power affects the applicant's rights qua subject? The applicant's rights may be
affected in this way where the exercise of power involves the imposition of
discipline or sanction.90 But the consequences of that discipline or sanction must
not be particular to the applicant, as in the case of The Aga Khan. In some way
there must be relevance to the wider public whether, say, by the setting of a new
standard of behaviour to which others must now comply or by the creation of a bad
precedent applicable in future cases. In McLaren v. The Home Office9l Woolf LJ
stated, albeit in a case concerning judicial review of decisions made during Crown
employment, that what might be required was a challenge to a decision of a
84. R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble [1990] I.R.L.R. 332, at p. 337 per Dillon LJ.
85. R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parteDatafinp.l.c. [1987] I All E.R. 564, at pp. 577-578
per Sir John Donaldson MR; Finnigan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R.
159, at pp. 178-179 per Cooke J.
86. In R. v. The Imam of Bury Park Jame MasjidLuton, Abdul Bari and Others, ex parte Sulaiman Ali
(unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 30 August 1991, Auld J, LEXIS), one of the reasons that
jurisdiction was refused was that the Imam's decision concerned only a comparatively small religious
community in Luton.
87. In Datafin, Sir John Donaldson MR pointed to the fact that the Panel's decisions affected many
members of the public who were not parties to them.
88. (1990) 2 Admin. L.R. 609, 629.
89. R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble [1990] I.R.L.R. 332, at p. 336 per WoolfLJ;R. v.
Royal Life Saving Society, ex parte Howe (unreported, Court of Appeal, IS May 1990, Lloyd and
McCowan LJ}, and Sir John Megaw, LEXIS).
90. E.g., cases where jurisdiction was conferred where there was an exercise of a disciplinary power
include: R. v. Advertising Standards Authority Ltd., ex parte The Insurance Service p.l.c. (1990) 2
Admin L.R. 77; R. v. Code of Practice Commicree of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, ex parte
Professional Counselling Aids Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 697;R. v. General Council fonhe Bar, ex parte
Percival (1990) 2 Admin. L.R. 721.
91. [1990] I.R.L.R. 338.
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disciplinary body which was the applicant's employer or which made a decision
which was of general application thereafter in the sense that it was a decision taken
as a matter of policy, not in relation to a particular member of staff, but in relation
to staff in general. Another kind of way in which the applicant's rights can be
affected qua subject is where the power exercised is analogous to a statutory
licensing power. This was thought to be relevant in at least two cases,92although in
both of them jurisdiction was not conferred. Similarly, where the exercise of
power affects the applicant's and others' livelihoods, this may be sufficient.
6. Other criteria
The courts in some cases93 have cited the lack of a remedy in private law as one
reason for conferring jurisdiction. However, the absence of any such remedy
should not be relevant to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the public element, and
the better view is that the absence of a private law remedy is irrelevant for this
purpose.94 Its relevance lies in being a consideration to be taken into account in
deciding whether to exercise the courts' discretion to grant a remedy once
jurisdiction has been conferred.95
Where the rules of natural justice are held to apply to the way in which a power is
exercised, this will not establish a sufficient public element for purposes of
jurisdiction.96
At least on one occasion97 the courts have said that business, executive or
management decisions do not have the requisite public element for purposes of
92.R. v.JockeyClub, exparteR. A. M. Race-coursesLtd. (1991) 3Admin L.R. 265;R. v. Chief Rabbi, ex
parte Wachmann (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 721.
93. InR. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafinp.l.c. [1987] 1All E.R. 564, at p. 577 Sir
John Donaldson MR found that arguments to the effect that the Panel could be adequately controlled
by private law were "wholly unconvincing"; R. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2
Admin L.R. 609, at p. 628 per Roch J. In Finnigan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1985]2
N.Z.L.R. 159, at pp. 178-179 Cooke J cited the absence of any other way to control the Union as one
reason for conferring standing in that case. In The Aga Khan one of the reasons why the Court of
Appeal held jurisdiction was not established was because there existed an alternative remedy by way of
action in contract. The Court of Appeal left open the question whether jurisdiction might be
established where the alternative remedy of action in contract was unavailable.
94. R. v. Lord Chancellor's Department, ex parte Nangle [1991] I.R.L.R. 343, 348; R. v. Royal Life
Saving Society, ex parte Howe (unreported, Court of Appeal, 15May 1990, Lloyd and McCowan LJJ,
and Sir John Megaw, LEXIS).
95. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Benwell [1985] 1 Q.B. 554, 571.
96. R. v. East Berkshire Health Authority, ex parte Walsh [1984] I.R.L.R. 278, at pp. 287-288 per
Purchas LJ; R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble [1990] I.R.L.R. 332, at pp. 334-335 per
Woolf LJ; R. v. The Football Association Ltd., ex parte The Football League Ltd. (unreported, Queen's
Bench Division, 31 July 1991, Rose J, LEXIS).
97. R. v. National Coal Board, ex parte National Union of Mineworkers [1986] I.C.R. 791, at p. 795per
MacPherson J. InR. v.Lloyd's of London, ex parte Brzggs (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 17July
1992, Leggatt LJ and Popplewell J, LEXIS) it appears that one of the reasons why jurisdiction to
review decisions of Lloyd's of London was found not to be established was because it would greatly
inhibit the proper discharge of its functions if it had constantly to be looking over its shoulder because
of the supposed duty to safeguard the interests of one section of the market (of which the applicants
were part).
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jurisdiction. Such statements may now be questionable in the light ofDatafin. The
character of a decision as commercial or as being a business judgment should not
be relevant to the question of jurisdiction, but only to the grounds upon which a
challenge can be made. Where one is asserting that a commercial decision should
be unreviewable, what is essentially being claimed is that the substance (or merits)
of the decision should not be evaluated by the courts. This is orthodox
administrative law theory. It breaks no new ground. Why should it not be that the
process or procedure by which that decision is reached be subject to judicial
scrutiny? What is wrong with requiring a body, in making a business judgment,
to comply with its own code in so doing? That is what was essentially required in
the cases reviewing the decisions of the Panel, and the same reasoning should
apply elsewhere.
III. PROHIBITION OF JURISDICTION
In certain circumstances, the nature of the relationship between the parties may
preclude success in an application for judicial review. In such cases the
relationship can be said to operate as a 'prohibition' against judicial review. In
many cases the courts have correctly identified the reason for the prohibition as
being the failure to establish a sufficient public element required to establish
jurisdiction. However, in casesconcerning contracts of membership, as in The Aga
Khan, the courts have unfortunately sometimes treated the prohibition as an
inflexible rule of policy and one not relating to the question of 'publicness'. The
prohibition has been of particular relevance in two types of case. The first iswhere
what is at issue is the employment relationship between the applicant and a
public body.98The second is where what is at issue is a contract of membership
between a body and the applicant. Until now the courts had not thought to regard
the prohibition operating in these two types of case as linked by the similarity of
the principles applicable. It is only since the development of the Datafin line of
authority that this link has been drawn. That link is, of course, the issue whether
the relationship (and in particular the contractual relationship) between the
applicant and decision-maker negates the 'publicness' of the decision. The
position in England and Scotland in this regard is quite different. An analysis of
Scottish law99is beyond the scope of this article, and in any event the position in
Scotland is now of less relevance in the English context given that the First
98. For recent analyses, seeH. Carty, "Aggrieved Public Sector Workers and Judicial Review", [1991]
54M.L.R. 129; S. Arrowsmith, "Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities",
(1990) 106L. Q.R. 277; S. Fredman and G. Morris, "Judicial Review and Civil Servants: Contracts of
Employment Declared to Exist", [1991]P.L. 485.
99. See C. M. G. Himsworth, "Public Employment and the Supervisory Jurisdiction", 1992S.L. T.
(News) 123; C. M. G. Himsworth, "Public Employment, the Supervisory Jurisdiction and Point
West", 1992S.L.T. 257; G.!. McPherson, "Judicial Review in Employment", (1992)37Journalofrhe
Law Sociery of Scorland314; W. J. Wolffe, "The Scope ofJudicial Review in Scots Law", [1992]P.L.
625.
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Division of the Court of Session has decisively rejected the distinction, made in
English law, between public and private as the basis for conferral of jurisdiction to
review under Rule of Court 260B (the Scottish equivalent to Order 53).1
The exact scope and nature of the prohibition is unclear. There are several tests
which have been applied by the courts. What follows is an evaluation of their
relative merit together with an analysis and statement of the underlying principles
that should apply. The various tests can be divided into those concerned with
contract, those concerned with submission to jurisdiction, those concerned with
the status of the decision-maker, and those concerned with whether there is an
"additional public law element".
1. Contract
One possibility is that jurisdiction might be excluded by the mere existence of a
contractual relationship between the decision-maker and the applicant. In Datafin
there was apparently a finding that the Panel was not in a contractual relationship
with the financial market or with those who deal in that market.2 However, in a
later case the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers was described as a form of
consensual agreement between affected parties,3 and in The Aga Khan Hoffmann
LJ accepted that "a body such as the Take-Over Panel ... which exercises
governmental powers is not any less amenable to public law because it has
contractual relations with its members."4 Datafin left unclear whether the
existence of a contractual relationship had any relevance to the conferral of the new
jurisdiction it had created. Since then, it has been at least implicit in the reasoning
of a number of cases that the mere existence of a contractual relationship between
the decision-maker and the applicant will preclude the conferral of jurisdiction. 5
However, other cases have not taken such a narrow view. Sometimes the courts
have specifically addressed the issue, and have held that there is jurisdiction even
tho~gh there is a contractual relationship. This was so in a Scottish case6 and there
1. West v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 S.L.T. 636.
2. Lewis argues that it was not clear from the evidence whether there was a contract between members
of the Panel or between the Bank of England and the bodies represented on the Panel, and that even if
there was, it is not clear whether this would bring about a contractual relationship between individual
members of the representative bodies and the Panel. Lewis makes the point that the Panel had
jurisdiction over individuals who were not members of any of the representative bodies or had no
contractual relationship with the Panel so that, in that instance at least, the Panel had no contractual
power: C. Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public Law (1992), p. 32, n. 27.
3. R. v. Spens [1991] 4 All E.R. 421, at p. 429 per Watkins LJ.
4. At p. 4.
5. R. v. Football Association of Wales, ex parte Flint .Town United Football Club (unreported, Queen's
Bench Division, 11 July 1990, Farquharson LJ and Nolan J, LEXIS); R. v. Lord Chancellor's
Department, ex parte Nangle [1991] I.R.L.R. 343,346-347; E. Jackson, "Civil Servants and Contracts
of Employment", (1992) 21 Industrial Law Journal 64, 66.
6. Bank of Scotland v. Investment Management Organisation Ltd. 1989 S.L. T. 432, at p. 437 per Lord
Cullen. Jurisdiction was conceded on appeal.
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is other Scottish authority to that effect.7 This authority has gained some support
in England.8 Moreover, in McLaren v. The Home Office9 the Court of Appeal
recognised that jurisdiction can exist even where there is a contract of some kind.
In Roy v.Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee, 10
a case concerning the question of procedural exclusivity under Order 53 (a matter
not at issue here), Lord Lowry did not discount the possibility of an application for
judicial review being able to be brought even though the applicant may have been
in a contractual relationship with the decision-maker. In The Aga Khan the three
members of the Court of Appeal relied on differing reasons as to why the contract
between the applicant and the Jockey Club negated jurisdiction. However,
Hoffmann LJ accepted that bodies such as the Panel or Investment Management
Regulatory Organisation Limited which exercise governmental powers are not
any less amenable to public law because they have contractual relations with their
members. Other cases have at least assumed the existence of jurisdiction even
where there is a recognised contractual relationship. I I So it can now be said with
some confidence that there can be jurisdiction where there is a contractual
relationship. This view is clearly correct as a matter of principle. Regardless of
whether a contractual relationship is the source of the exercise of the power which
is subject to challenge, its existence should be irrelevant under the nature of the
power test because that test is not concerned with the source of the power but only
with its nature.
Another possibility is that jurisdiction might be excluded when the decision-
maker's authority is derived from a contract with the applicant. It is to be noted
that a prohibition formulated in this way differs from a prohibition based on the
mere existence of a contractual relationship. The former requires that authority
derive from the contract, whereas the latter merely requires the existence of that
contract. 'Authority' in this context means the power the exercise ofwhich is being
challenged. The idea that jurisdiction might be excluded when the decision-
maker's authority derives from a contract with the applicant follows from the
leading case of Law v. National Greyhound Racing Club.12 The precise scope of
Law's case remains unclear because the Court of Appeal appeared to apply three
7. See C. M. G. Himsworth, "Public Employment and the Supervisory Jurisdiction", 1992S.L. T.
(News) 123; C. M. G. Himsworth, "Public Employment, the Supervisory Jurisdiction and Points
West", 1992S.L. T. 257.
8. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Mac/aim Watson & Co. Ltd., J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) !rd.
[1989] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 570, 625.
9. [1990] I.R.L.R. 338.
10. [1992] 2 W.L.R. 239,261. See Fredman and Morris, "A Snake or a Ladder: O'ReiJlv v.Mackman
Reconsidered", (1992) 108L.Q.R. 353; P. Cane, "Private Rights and Public Procedure", [1992]P.L.
193.
11. R. v. Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers !rd. and Another, ex parte Mordens !rd. (1991)3
Admin L.R. 254;R. v.Kidderminster District Valuer, West Midlands Police Authority and the Secretary
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Powell and Police Federation of England and Wales (West
Midlands Branch) [1991] 31 R.V.R. 197.
12. [1983] 1W.L.R. 1302.
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different tests prohibitive of jurisdiction. The first asked whether the decision-
maker's authority derived wholly from contract. The second asked whether there
was a voluntary submission to the decision-maker's jurisdiction. The third asked
whether the status of the decision-maker was that of a private or domestic tribunal.
Implicit in the judgments is the view that all three tests will always give the same
answer. But that would not appear to be the case. For example, it is possible to
envisage a situation where there is a voluntary submission to jurisdiction but the
decision-maker's authority is not derived wholly from contract.
The second and third tests are examined below. As for the first, it finds some
support in the case law. In a series of cases, in which the relevant contractual
relationship was a contract of membership with the decision-making body, it has
been held that jurisdiction is excluded when the decision-maker's authority is
derived from a contract with the applicant.13 For example, in R. v. Lloyd's of
London, ex parte Briggs 14 leave given to a number of Lloyd's Names to seek judicial
review of decisions of Lloyd's and its officers arising out of losses incurred in the
reinsurance market was set aside for the reason that there was no public element
about the exercise of power. The Court held that the exercise of power subject to
challenge derived from the contract entered into by the Names with Lloyd's.
Without more the case would appear to be authority for the view that power
derived from a contract with the applicant will be insufficiently public. However,
it is clear that, in reaching its decision, the Court was influenced by the fact that the
contract contained what was, in effect, an 'ouster' clause and that the inability of
the Names to challenge the decisions of Lloyd's which that clause implied was
consistent with the purposes for which Lloyd's existed, so that it would be
contrary to those purposes to allow such a challenge. This is really a question of
Parliament's intention (Lloyd's having been placed on a statutory footing from
which its purposes were construed) as to the availability of judicial review and not
at all a question of the effect of contract.
Law's case was cited in argument in Datafin but not in any of the judgments.
Lloyd LJ inDatafin said that if "the source of power is contractual, as in the caseof
private arbitration, then clearly the arbitrator is not subject to judicial
review.... "15 This would appear to be consistent with the approach taken in
13. Law v. National Greyhound Racing Club [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1302; R. v. Jockey Club, ex parte
Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609; R. v. Jockey Club, ex parte R.A.M. Race-courses Ltd.
(1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 265 per Stuart-Smith LJ and contra per Simon Brown J; R. v. The Football
Association Ltd., ex parte The Football League Ltd. (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 31 July 1991,
Rose J, LEXIS); R. v. Football Association of Wales, ex parle Flint Town United Football Club
(unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 11 July 1990, Farquharson LJ and Nolan J, LEXIS); R. v.
Eastern Counties Rugby Union and Another, ex parte Basildon Rugby Club (unreported, Queen's Bench
Division, 10 September 1987,MacPherson J, LEXIS). There are other cases which have cited Law's
case as authority in this area but whose judgments were given in reliance on other grounds; R. v.Royal
LIfe Saving Society, ex parle Howe (unreported, Court of Appeal, IS May 1990, Lloyd and McCowan
LJJ, and Sir John Megaw, LEXIS); McLaren v. The Home Office [1990] I.R.L.R. 338.
14. Unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 17 July 1992, Leggan LJ and Popplewell J, LEXIS.
15. [1987] I All E.R. 564,583.
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Law's case. However, the immunity of arbitrators from challenge by way of
judicial review is a well-recognised exception,16 and for this reason Lloyd LJ's
statement should not be regarded as a statement of general principle. In The Aga
Khan the Court of Appeal held that Datafin concerned the exercise of
"governmental" power. Hoffmann LJ was of the view that because the Jockey
Club was not exercising governmental power Law's case applied and its
application did not conflict with the principle inData/in. He was of the view that
where there is a contract of membership between the applicant and a body which
was a surrogate organ of government (or which exercised governmental power)
there may well be a conflict between the principle inDatafin and Law's case, and
he appeared to accept that in that instance the principle inDatafin would prevail,
giving the example of the Panel and Investment Management Regulatory
Organisation Limited as bodies which have contractual relations with their
members but which are validly subject to judicial review because they exercise
governmental power. As "governmental power" is really another way of referring
to public power, Hoffmann LJ's view amounted to little more than saying - quite
correctly - that, where a body with whom the applicant has a contract of
membership exercises public power, that contract will not negate jurisdiction.
The first test in Law's case refers to authority derived wholly from contract.
Where authority is derived partly or wholly from some other source, the
prohibition will not apply. L 7 Thus, where the ultimate source of power is statutory
but the immediate source of power is a contract between the applicant and
decision-maker, in circumstances where the statute has compulsorily imposed
both the contract and its terms, it may be that the prohibition will not apply.ls
Likewise, where the authority is derived partly from a contract of employment and
partly from a statute under-pinning that contract, the prohibition may not apply. 19
Apart from these exceptions, there also exist the cases (discussed above, in dealing
with prohibition by mere existence of a contractual relationship) where
jurisdiction was conferred despite the existence of a contractual relationship which
was also the source of authority.
Without even having to point to these exceptions it is believed that, as a matter
of general principle, the first test inLaw's case is not, and should not, be applicable
to "nature of the power" cases. Law's case was decided at a time when the test of
jurisdiction was the source of power, and its reasoning relies on identifiying that
source. It is simply not relevant when what is at issue is the nature of the power.
16. Council of Civil Service Unions v.Minisrer for rhe Civil Service [1984] 3 All E.R. 935, at pp. 949-950
per Lord Diplock.
17. R. v.Jockey Club, ex parre Massingberd-Mundy (1990) 2 Admin.L.R. 609, at pp. 632-633 per Roch J.
18. This is the view, obirer, of Lloyd LJ in R. v. The Independenr Broadcasring Authority, ex parte the
Rank Organisation p. I.c. (unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 March 1986, May and Lloyd L]J, and Sir
John Megaw, LEXIS).
19. R. v. Easr Berkshire Health Authority, ex parre Walsh [1984] I.R.L.R. 278; Websrer v. Auckland
Harbour Board [1983] N.Z.L.R. 646, at p. 650 per Cooke J.
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Another possibility is that jurisdiction might be excluded even when the
contract conferring authority on the decision-maker is between the applicant and a
third party or between the decision-maker and a third party. Turning first to
contracts between the applicant and a third party, the leading case is the Court of
Appeal decision ofR. v. The Independent Broadcasting Authority, ex parte the Rank
Organisation p.l.c .. 20 Here the Independent Broadcasting Authority, had power
under article 75Aof the articles of association of Granada Group p.1.c., in which it
was not a shareholder, to refuse to allow any shareholder with more than five per
cent of the voting rights to exercise those rights. The Court of Appeal held that the
power of refusal arose solely under the articles of association and not under the
Broadcasting Act 1981. It was held that there was no jurisdiction. The articles of
association constituted a contract between Granada Group p.1.c. and its
shareholders (including Rank), but not between those shareholders and the
Authority. Thus the Authority derived the power which was subject to challenge
from a contract to which it was not a party. That contract allowed it to enforce its
power against the applicant, Rank, with whom it was not in a contractual
relationship.
The case would appear, prima facie, to be authority for the proposition that the
prohibition will apply even where the decision-maker's authority derives from a
contract to which it is not a party, although the applicant is party to it. However,
the judgments do not rely on such wide reasoning. Rather, at issue was the extent
to which the power exercised by the Authority was 'under-pinned' by the
provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1981. It is clear from the judgments that, had
there been sufficient under-pinning, there would have been jurisdiction. The case
is really one where there simply was not a sufficient public element for purposes of
jurisdiction. It is not authority for the scope of any prohibition relating to powers
derived from contract and, in any event, it pre-dates Datafin and for that reason
may no longer be good law.
Moreover, a case in private law with some affinity with the issue of jurisdiction
in public law goes against the view in Rank. In Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v.
Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd., J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. 21 the plaintiff sued
the defendant in respect of contracts for the sale and purchase of tin after the
London Metal Exchange, of which only the defendant was a member, purported
by a ruling to alter the terms of settlement of the contracts. The plaintiff
challenged the Exchange's power to make the rule. Webster J drew on an analogy
with public law in applying what may be traditionally regarded as administrative
law restraints relevant to the control of the exercise of power by the Exchange. He
referred to, and rejected, prohibitions based on the contractual nature of the
relationship. Of particular relevance for present purposes isWebster ]'S view that
the Exchange was required to comply with these various public law standards
20. Unreported, Court of Appeal, 26March 1986,Mary and Lloyd LJJ and Sir John Megaw, LEXIS.
21. [1989] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 570.
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notwithstanding that the Exchange derived its power, at least so far as it affected
the plaintiff, from a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. The fact that
the defendant had a contract of membership with the decision-maker (the
Exchange) does not distinguish the case from Rank because the authority
conferred on the Exchange to decide matters in respect of the plaintiff was not
conferred by that contract.
Turning to caseswhere the contract conferring authority on the decision-maker
to decide matters in respect of the applicant is between the decision-maker and a
third party, these also suggest that Rank was not correctly decided. They are
relevant to the issue decided inRank because they, likeRank, concern the situation
where the contract conferring authority on the decision-maker to decide matters in
respect of the applicant is not between the decision-maker and the applicant.
Although one recent case22suggests that, where there is a contract between the
decision-maker and a third party conferring authority on the decision-maker to
decide matters in respect of the applicant, the fact of that contract will negate the
necessary public element required to establish jurisdiction, of more authority and
to contrary effect is the Court of Appeal decision of R. v. Life Assurance and Unit
Trust Regulatory Organisation Ltd., ex parte Ross.23Here there was a contract of
membership between the decision-maker and a third party (conferring authority
on the decision-maker to decide matters in respect of the applicant, who was not
party to it), and a contract between the third party and the applicant, but no
contract between the applicant and the decision-maker. It was conceded,
apparently correctly in the view of the Court, that jurisdiction was established. In
The Aga Khan the contract at issue was between the Jockey Club (the decision-
maker) and the applicant, and jurisdiction was held not to be established.
However, the Court of Appeal specifically left open the question whether
jurisdiction could be established when the decision-maker's authority to decide
matters in respect of the applicant arose from contract (the contracts of
membership with other members), but not one to which the applicant was party.
Although The AgaKhan leaves the question open, Shearson and ex parte Ross are to
the contrary effect of Rank. Underlying them and recent Scottish authority24 to
similar effect is the idea that where there is a 'tripartite relationship' between the
decision-maker, the applicant and a third party in circumstances where the
decision-maker's authority to decide matters in respect of the applicant derives
from a contract between the decision-maker and a third party or between the
applicant and a third party, jurisdiction to challenge the decision-maker's decision
should not be negated merely by reason of the existence of any such contract.
22. R. v. Fernhi/l Manor School, ex parte Brown (unreported, Queen's Bench Division, 22 May 1992,
Brooke J, LEXIS).
23. Unreported, Court of Appeal, 11June 1992, Glidewell, Stocker and McCowan LJJ, LEXIS. See
A. Lidbetter "Financial Services: The Right to Make Representations", [1992]P.L. 533.
24. West v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1992S.L. T. 636.
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Rather, at least in English law, jurisdiction can be established if the applicant is
able to point to some other factor importing a public element to the decision being
challenged.
Another possibility is that jurisdiction might be excluded when the applicant
seeks to sue on or enforce the provisions of a contract with the decision-maker.
One way of interpreting the prohibition is to have regard to its function or
purpose. If the purpose for the rule can be identified then the scope of the rule can
be more readily defined. What is the purpose of the prohibition? It seems that the
purpose of the prohibition is to prevent an applicant from suing on or enforcing a
contractual right or obligation by using public law remedies. Therefore, the
prohibition should not apply where the applicant is not seeking to sue on or
enforce a contract, even though there may be a contractual relationship and the
decision-maker's authority may derive from contract. In fact, Law's case supports
this approach. The plaintiff sought to proceed by way of ordinary action in
contract for a declaration of breach of an implied term, and it was the defendant
which sought to force the plaintiff to proceed by way of judicial review. In holding
that the plaintiff was not so constrained, the Court of Appeal recognised that the
plaintiff's claim was "based primarily and explicitly on alleged breach of
contract. "25
Later cases have specifically applied this approach by asking what it is that the
plaintiff is seeking to achieve by bringing the application for judicial review.
Purchas LJ applied it inR. v.East Berkshire Health A uthority, ex parte Walsh. 26 He
said:27
"In my judgment the enquiry ought to be directed towards the rights alleged
to be infringed and the remedies enjoyed rather that the status enjoyed, qua
contract or appointment, by the applicant .... If the remedy sought is a
purely private contractual remedy, then it is difficult to see how such a
remedy could attract the supervisory powers of the court which were
originally limited to the issue of prerogative writs."
This statement was approved and applied by Woolf LJ in R. v. Derbyshire
County Council, ex parte Noble,28 and Walsh has since been interpreted as a case
where the reason why the applicant could not proceed under Order 53was because
he was seeking to enforce contractual rights. 29 In The Aga Khan one of the reasons
Sir Thomas Bingham MR relied on in holding that jurisdiction was not
established was that the applicant was attempting to enforce contractual rights in
25. [1983] I W.L.R. 1302, at p. 1312per Slade LJ.
26. [1984] I.R.L.R. 278.
27. [1984] I.R.L.R. 278, 285.
28. [1990] I.R.L.R. 332, 334.
29. Doyle v. Northumbria Probation Committee [1991] 4 All E.R. 294, at p. 300 per Henry J.
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judicial review which could be enforced in private law. Other examples where,
implicitly, this approach has been applied include McLaren v. The Home Office,30
where Woolf LJ in the Court of Appeal asked what it was that the plaintiff was
seeking to achieve. He held that essentially the plaintiff was seeking clarification as
to the terms of his employment and a sum alleged due and that these are private
law claims, so that the claim should proceed by action. No other public issue arose.
Similarly, in R. v. Secretary for State for the Home Department, ex parte Benwell31
the reason why the applicant was entitled to seek judicial review was because he
was not trying to enforce the terms of a contract as, even if there was a contract of
employment, the disciplinary procedures which he was trying to have enforced
against his employer were not incorporated into it as terms of that contract.
Therefore, where the applicant seeks to enforce rights or obligations which have
no nexus with any contract between the applicant and the decision-maker, the
applicant will be entitled to pursue them by an application for judicial review. The
courts should continue to apply this test. It is both workable and attractive because
it takes a functional view of what it is that the applicant is attempting to achieve. It
is subject to a qualification, discussed below, that where there is an "additional
public law element" the fact that the applicant is seeking to enforce or sue on a
contract will not bring the prohibition into play.
2. Submission to jurisdiction
Jurisdiction might be excluded when the applicant voluntarily or consensually
submits to the jurisdiction of the decision-maker. This is the second test
prohibitive of jurisdiction in Law's case. The test has been variously referred to as
a voluntary or consensual submission to jurisdiction and as a voluntary entry into a
consensual relationship. In Datafin, the Master of the Rolls referred to the
exclusion from the supervisory jurisdiction of bodies whose sole source of power is
a consensual submission to that body's jurisdiction, and for this reason
Farquharson LJ in The Aga Khan was of the view that Datafin and Law's case are
consistent. The test has gained support in some later cases,32but in The AgaKhan
of the three members of the Court of Appeal only Farquharson LJ thought that
this test waswhat was at issue inLaw's case - the other members preferring to treat
Law's case as more akin to a rule of policy against review where there is a contract.
It is clear, however, that the test of voluntary or consensual submission to
jurisdiction is not dependent in its application on the existence of a contractual
relationship or on there being authority derived from contract. 33
30. [1990] I.R.L.R. 338.
31. [1985] 1 Q.B. 554.
32. R. v.Jockey Club, ex parte Massingberd-M undy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, at p. 629 per Roch J.;R. v.
Jockey Club, ex parte R.A.M. Race-courses Lcd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 265, at pp. 293-294 per Simon
Brown J.
33. Counsel's argument to this effect was accepted by the court in R. v. Lord Chancel/or's Department,
ex parte Nangle [1991] I.R.L.R. 343, 347-348.
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The courts have restricted the scope of the test by holding that jurisdiction will
not be prohibited unless there is a true submission, awholly consensual submission
or no effective choice. However, in The Aga Khan Farquharson LJ accepted that, if
the applicant wished to race horses in Britain he had no choice but to accept the
Jockey Club's jurisdiction, but was of the view that that does not destroy the
element of consensuality as the applicant is not obliged to race horses in Britain.
This more liberal approach as to just what will be consensual should be resisted. It
should be the case that there is no true consent or submission if a contract and its
terms are imposed compulsorily.34Likewise, persons whose activity is controlled
by the rules of a body in circumstances where they have no vote or voice in the
amendment of those rules or in their promulgation, and whose only alternative to
their accepting those rules is to be excluded altogether from the activity, should be
regarded as having no effective choice.35 Similarly, an orthodox Rabbi, in
pursuing a vocation, has no choice but to accept the Chief Rabbi's disciplinary
decisions and the same can be said of members of the Bar and of universities. 36
On a number of occasions the courts have conferred jurisdiction even though
there was clear recognition of there being a consensual submission to
jurisdiction.37 Some cases have also sought to restrict the test of voluntary or
consensual submission to jurisdiction to arbitrators or private or domestic
tribunals.38 It is clear, therefore, that despite endorsement by Farquharson LJ in
The Aga Khan, this test is of doubtful use. It has been variously restricted in scope,
confined to certain classes of case, exceptions to it have been created or it simply
has not been applied.
3. Status of decision-maker
Jurisdiction might be excluded when the decision-maker is a voluntary or
domestic tribunal. This follows from the third test in Law's case, which asked
whether the status of the decison-maker was that of a private or domestic tribunal.
This prohibition was promulgated by Lord Parker CJ in R. v. Criminallnjun'es
34. R. v. The lndependenr Broadcasting Authority, ex parte the Rank Organisation p.l.c. (unreported,
Court of Appeal, 26 March 1986, May and Lloyd LJJ and Sir John Megaw, LEXIS), per Lloyd LJ
(obiter).
35. R. v .Jockey Club, ex parte M assingberd-M undy (1990) 2 Admin L.R. 609, at pp. 630-631 per Roch J.
36. R. v. Chief Rabln~ ex parte Wachmann (1991) 3 Admin L.R. 721, 727.
37. In Darafin jurisdiction was conferred even though the Master of the Rolls acknowledged that some
of those persons affected may in a technical sense be said to have assented to this situation. In R. v.
Spens [1991] 4 AllE.R. 421 Watkins LJ, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, referred to
the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers as a form of consensual agreement between affected parties.
In R. v. Code of Practice Committee of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, ex parte Professional
Counselling Aids Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 697 jurisdiction was conferred even though Popplewell J at
p. 718 said that, although the applicant was not in a contractual relationship with the respondents, he
voluntarily submitted to their jurisdiction. See also R. v. Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers
Ltd., and Another, ex parte Mordens Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 254, 260.
38. R. v. Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachmann (1991) 3 Admin. L. R. 721, 727; R. v.Jockey Club, ex parte
R.A.M. Race-courses Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 265, at pp. 293-294 per Simon Brown J.
221
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
Compensation Board, ex parte Lain, where he said:39
"Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of
certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is, from
the agreement of the parties concerned."
A prohibition in those terms was referred to by Lloyd LJ in Datafin and it has
been occasionally applied by the courts.40 However, there is some conflicting
Australian authority in this regard. Although there is some Australian authority
taking the orthodox view that the decisions of domestic, private or voluntary
tribunals are unreviewable,41 there are dicta of the Australian courts suggesting
that, where a domestic or private body is exercising public power, the exercise of
that power will be reviewable.42In fact, this accords with the approach to be taken
under the nature of the power test. It is not the status of the body, but the public
character of the exercise of the power, which determines jurisdiction. Simon
Brown J supported this view in R. v. Jockey Club, ex parte R.A.M. Race-courses
Ltd.43 and in The Aga Khan Hoffmann LJ saw "no reason why a private club
should not also exercise public powers. "44
The main problem with a prohibition focusing on the status of a body as private,
domestic or voluntary is that that status has never been adequately defined or
prescribed by the courts and nor has the test been consistently applied. It has been
suggested that domestic tribunals are tribunals "whose jurisdiction is confined to
the internal affairs of some profession or association .... "45But this definition is
quite inadequate. It could easily be said that the Ethical Committee of St. Mary's
Hospital,46 the Code of Practice Committee of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry,41 the General Council for the Bar,48the London Metal Exchange,49and
the New Zealand Rugby Football Union50are all bodies whose jurisdictions are
confined to the internal affairs of their respective professions or associations, yet in
39. [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, 882.
40. E.g., R. v. The Football Association Ltd., ex parte The Football League Ltd. (unreported, Queen's
Bench Division, 31 July 1991, Rose J, LEXIS).
41. E.g., Dixon v. Australian Society of Accountants (1989) 95 F.L.R. 231, at p. 238 per Miles CJ.
42. Della- Vedova and Another v. State Energy Commission of Western Australia (1990) 2W.A.R. 561, at
p. 568 per Ipp J (Supreme Court of Western Australia); S. D. Rotop, Principles of Australian
Administrative Law 6th ed. (1985), pp. 271-272.
43. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 265,293-294.
44. At p. 1.
45. R. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law 6th ed (1988), p. 647.
46.R. v. Ethical Commirtee of St. Mary'sHospital (Manchester), exparteHarriou [1988] 1F.L.R. 512.
47. R. v. Code of Practice Committee of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, ex parte Professional
Counselling Aids Ltd. (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 697.
48. R. v. General Council for the Bar, ex parte Percival (1990) 2 Admin. L.R. 721.
49. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd., J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd.
[1989] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 570.
50. Finnigan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 159.
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each case jurisdiction was conferred. In any event, it is not the status of the
decision-maker which is relevant, but the nature of the decision itself. Just as
public bodies can make decisions which are 'private' and therefore unreviewable,
so too may private bodies make 'public' decisions which are reviewable. To ask
whether a body is domestic merely begs the question. A body is defined by the
nature of its powers. It may be public for some purposes and private for others.
Given that the test is problematic with respect to application and has not been
consistently applied it would be preferable to discard it.
4. Additional public law element
Jurisdiction might be excluded unless there is an 'additional public law element'.
Thus, where there is a contractual relationship or the decision-maker's authority is
derived from contract, an 'additional public law element' will establish a sufficient
public element for purposes of jurisdiction.51
What is meant by an 'additional public law element'? Assuming that the
applicant has a contract with the decision-maker, there will be an additional public
law element where the subject-matter of the application for judicial review arises
out of that contract, and:
1. the applicant's dispute over some aspect of the contractual relationship has
been decided upon by a body external to the decison-maker;
2. the applicant is adversely affected by a decision of general application made
by the decision-maker. This will include decisions as to general policy
applicable to all, and not merely the applicant;
3. the decision-maker's decision, in relation to the applicant, sets an adverse
precedent for future cases;
4. the decision-maker's decision concerns the interpretation of its own legal
powers;
5. generally, the decision-maker's decision has repercussions not limited to the
applicant.
5. Conclusions
Having reviewed and evaluated the various possible tests for the prohibition, it is
possible to formulate some rules which should be of general application. Where
there is a contractual relationship or the decision-maker's authority is derived
from contract, and the applicant:
1. is seeking to enforce or sue on the contract, there will not be jurisdiction
unless there is an additional public law element;
2. is not seeking to enforce or sue on the contract, there will be jurisdiction if
51. This rule is implicit in McLaren v. The Home Office [1990] I.R.L.R. 338 and in R. v. Lord
Chancel/or's Department, ex parte Nangle [1991] I.R.L.R. 343.
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there is a sufficient public element. A sufficient public element is established in
the usual way by applying the criteria discussed in this article. It may also be
established by pointing to an additional public law element.
IV. THE FUTURE
What is interesting about the development of the control of the exercise of public
power by way of judicial review is that it allows the courts to make a qualitative
assessment of the nature of the power being exercised and to evaluate in functional
terms the wider constitutional or governmental role of bodies whose decisions are
being challenged. That iswhy it is a pity that the Court of Appeal in The Aga Khan
should have chosen to endorse the 'rule' in Law's case and to have concerned itself
so with matters of contract. Contract is not the issue. The real issue facing the
courts is a question of judicial policy about the extent to which they are prepared to
place fetters on the workings of a system of devolved State decision-making. In
these days of privatisation when the State is being "rolled back", and being
replaced with surrogate organs of government, it is interesting to speculate about
the point at which the courts will say that power delegated in this way ceases to be
public for purposes of judicial review. If the views of the Court of Appeal in The
Aga Khan are anything to go by, a close connection with government and
incorporation within an enacted framework of public regulation might be
required.
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